ReD-Pot Community Edition¶
ReD-Pot places decoy servers inside your network and makes them look like your own: a Windows file server, an Active Directory domain controller, a Linux web server, a backup server or a DNS server, all carrying your domain, your host-naming scheme and believable users and files. Real users have no reason to touch them, so any connection to a decoy is a signal, and a stolen bait credential being used is close to proof of an intrusion.
This site documents ReD-Pot Community Edition (CE) 1.0.1, the free, open-source (MIT) edition published at github.com/RedSideSecurity/ReD-Pot. Features that exist only in ReD-Pot Enterprise are marked with an Enterprise feature box.
What ReD-Pot does¶
-
Decoy servers
Five roles: Windows file server, Windows domain controller (LDAP, Kerberos, DNS, SYSVOL), Linux web server, FTP/backup server and Linux DNS server. Each decoy answers on the IP of its own network interface.
-
Baits and honeytokens
Planted passwords, SSH keys,
.envfiles, database dumps, a GPP password, a Kerberoastable account and Word documents that report when opened. Each one has a unique id. -
Severity ladder L1 to L5
Events are grouped into incidents per source and scored by how far the source got, from a TCP touch to a stolen credential being used.
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Alerts for your SIEM
Incidents at L3 and above are written to
alerts.json(JSON Lines) for Wazuh, Splunk, ELK or any log shipper, and can be exported as one JSON file.
Where it fits in an intrusion¶
Most intrusions do not stop at the first compromised machine. After initial access, the attacker has to look around, collect credentials and move to other servers. ReD-Pot sits in that window:
| Stage | What the attacker does | What ReD-Pot sees |
|---|---|---|
| Discovery | port scans, share listings, LDAP queries, DNS zone transfers | L3 intent: someone is mapping a server nobody uses |
| Credential access | reads passwords.txt, .env, GPP passwords, Kerberoasts a service account |
L4 compromise: a bait file was read |
| Lateral movement | uses the stolen password or key on the next server | L5 honeytoken: a bait credential was used, with the workstation and user |
An L5 alert reads like this: "password planted on RS-FS-01 used on RS-WEB-01 by ACC-PC-07 (anna.k)". The attacker gains nothing useful, because every file and password on a decoy is fake.
Architecture at a glance¶
flowchart LR
subgraph LAN["Your LAN / VLANs"]
WS["Workstation<br/>(attacker foothold)"]
end
subgraph MGR["Manager server"]
D1["Decoy: file server<br/>own interface + IP"]
D2["Decoy: domain controller<br/>own interface + IP"]
C["Manager console<br/>web UI + sensor API<br/>(management interface only)"]
end
subgraph REM["Remote site"]
S["Remote sensor<br/>decoy + relay"]
end
WS -- "scan, logon, steal bait" --> D1
WS -- "reuse stolen credential" --> D2
WS -.-> S
D1 -- events --> C
D2 -- events --> C
S -- "pinned TLS" --> C
C --> J["alerts.json<br/>to your SIEM"]
See Architecture for the components and how they talk to each other.
Community Edition and Enterprise¶
| Community Edition | Enterprise | |
|---|---|---|
| Licence | MIT, free | commercial licence |
| Decoy roles, baits, honeytokens, L1-L5 scoring, network map, world map, wall screen | ||
alerts.json / events.json for your SIEM, JSON export |
||
| Remote sensors with pinned TLS | ||
| In-place update | (install.sh update) |
signed offline bundles |
| Number of decoys | up to 3 | more than 3 (set by the licence) |
| Decoy placement | one decoy per interface, on that interface's own IP | also extra IPs, VLANs and vendor MAC addresses |
| Outbound alerts (Telegram, e-mail, webhook) and alert rules | - | |
| Sensor offline spool and replay | - | |
| Block an attacker IP on all decoys, country filter | - | |
| Editable persona and users | - | |
| Retention per data type, custom TLS certificate, audit log | - |
The full comparison is on Community and Enterprise.
Next steps¶
- New to ReD-Pot? Read How it works, then Plan your network.
- Ready to install? Go to the Quick start.
- Questions or a bug? See Support. Security issues: Security policy.
Authorised use only
Use ReD-Pot only on networks you own or are authorised to protect.