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How it works

The idea

A honeypot is a fake system that exists only to be attacked. Real users never need it, so any connection to it is suspicious by definition. There is no normal business traffic to a decoy, so there are no false positives from it.

ReD-Pot places such decoys inside your network and makes them look like your servers. A decoy behaves like a real server up to the point of a successful login, and then serves believable but fake data. Nothing an attacker sends is executed. Every decoy carries bait (credentials, keys, documents), and each bait is a honeytoken with a unique id: when it is used anywhere, ReD-Pot knows where it was stolen from.

sequenceDiagram
    participant WS as ACC-PC-07 (phished)
    participant FS as RS-FS-01 (file server decoy)
    participant WEB as RS-WEB-01 (web decoy)
    participant M as ReD-Pot manager
    WS->>FS: 1. scan, list shares
    FS-->>M: L3 intent
    WS->>FS: 2. read \\RS-FS-01\IT\passwords.txt
    FS-->>M: L4 compromise
    WS->>WEB: 3. SSH with the stolen deploy password
    WEB-->>M: L5 honeytoken: "password planted on RS-FS-01 used on RS-WEB-01 by ACC-PC-07 (anna.k)"
    M->>M: one incident, attack path FS-01 → WEB-01, alerts.json

Why internal deception works

Stage What the attacker does Example
1. Initial access gets in phishing e-mail, stolen VPN password, exposed service
2. Foothold establishes a stable presence on one machine malware or a remote-access tool on a workstation
3. Discovery looks around the network port scans, share enumeration, LDAP queries, DNS zone transfer
4. Credential access collects passwords passwords.txt, .env files, Group Policy passwords, Kerberoasting
5. Lateral movement uses those credentials on other servers SSH, RDP or SMB into the next machine
6. Impact steals data or deploys ransomware the expensive part

Perimeter controls and EDR focus on stage 1. Attackers who get past them often use legitimate tools and real credentials, so they look like normal admins. ReD-Pot targets stages 2 to 5, the window between "they are in" and "the damage is done": the attacker has to explore to move on, and the decoys sit exactly where they look.

Scoring

ReD-Pot scores how far a source got, not how many packets it sent. Events from one source are grouped into one incident that only goes up the ladder:

Level Name Meaning
L1 touch TCP handshake only
L2 interaction protocol data exchanged
L3 intent trying to get in or map things
L4 compromise it worked: login, file read, command, tampering
L5 honeytoken a stolen bait was used

Details and thresholds: Incidents and levels.

Who did it

ReD-Pot identifies the source as precisely as the protocols allow:

  • Workstation name from SMB, RDP (CredSSP/NLA) and NTLM messages.
  • Logged-on user: only an account a decoy really accepted.
  • Users tried: every name typed, sprayed or sent.
  • Tools: HTTP user agents, SSH client versions, the RDP cookie.

Hard to fingerprint

  • Your domain, host names, users, files and certificates; passwords and file contents differ per installation.
  • Protocol details follow the real products: SMB dialects and OS version of Windows Server 2019, RDP with NLA and a Remote-Desktop-style certificate, Windows DNS behaviour on the DC, Apache error pages on the web decoy, TTL 128 for Windows decoys.
  • On a decoy's interface only that decoy's ports answer, and the decoy uses the interface's real MAC address.

Known limits of the Community Edition decoys

  • The Windows decoys negotiate SMB 2.0.2 and 2.1 only. A client that lists dialects (for example nmap --script smb-protocols) sees that SMB 3.x is missing.
  • Decoys use the Linux host's TCP/IP stack, so active OS fingerprinting (nmap -O) reports Linux, also for a Windows persona.
  • Kerberos-authenticated (GSSAPI) LDAP binds are refused on the domain controller; NTLM binds work.