Security hardening¶
ReD-Pot is built to be attacked. The design goal is that a fully hijacked decoy gains nothing: no route to the manager, no secrets worth having, no way to speak for another sensor.
Built-in protections¶
Containers¶
- Run as uid 10001 with no capabilities (
cap_drop: ALL),no-new-privileges, the default seccomp profile, a read-only root filesystem (only tmpfs and data volumes are writable), memory and process limits, log rotation, and no Docker socket. - The image has no setuid or setgid files.
- Host-network decoys start as root with only
NET_BIND_SERVICE,SETUID,SETGIDandSETPCAPunderno-new-privileges. The entrypoint drops at once to uid 10001 and keeps onlyNET_BIND_SERVICE. A service started as root without that drop refuses to run.
Network¶
- On each decoy interface only the decoy's ports answer; everything else looks closed, IPv6 included.
- Admin ports answer only on the management interface, to their allow-lists.
- Decoys cannot open the web UI,
127.0.0.1, the LAN or the internet (egress guard). The server does not route for a decoy LAN. - See Ports and firewall.
Hijacked decoy¶
A decoy holds only its own key and a hashed honeytoken index. It cannot open the web UI, cannot rewrite its configuration (read-only mounts) and cannot report as another sensor. The domain controller decoy additionally holds the Kerberos keys of the bait accounts valid on it: password-equivalent for the fake domain only, never the plaintext.
Untrusted input¶
- Control characters are stripped and fields capped at the sensor.
- Every value in the console is escaped, with a strict Content Security Policy.
- Every SQL query is parameterised; file paths are confined; archive extraction refuses
.., links and devices. - Protocol parsers (BER, DNS) are bounded and fuzz-tested.
- Nothing an attacker sends is ever executed. URLs typed into the fake shell are recorded, never fetched.
Floods¶
One connection budget per decoy, shared by every TCP service: 250 concurrent connections, 20 per source IP, and no new client while the decoy runs 320 threads. SMB sessions without a named logon close after 60 seconds idle. UDP is rate-limited per source and replies are capped (no amplification). Request bodies are capped. A listener that dies is restarted and reported.
Manager¶
- TLS 1.2+, HMAC-signed
HttpOnly,SameSite=Strictsession cookies, throttled login, a CSRF header on state changes and on export, and a separate read-only cookie for wall screens. - No outbound connections for alerting: alerts stay in
alerts.jsonand the database. - Tried passwords are stored masked.
Your checklist¶
- Put decoys on their own interfaces where possible, so attackers on the decoy LAN never see an admin port.
- Keep the web UI, sensor API and SSH allow-lists as narrow as possible (
set-access). Avoid0.0.0.0/0when a decoy shares the management interface. - Keep the admin token,
rpot.json,INSTALL-INFO.txt, exports and backups secret and root-only. Rotate the token withreset-tokenif it may have leaked. - Never put a sensor join string on a command line; use the prompt,
--join -or--join-file. - Give the manager, decoy interfaces and sensors static addresses (or DHCP reservations) and working NTP.
- On remote sensors, add a switch or firewall ACL so the decoy IP may only answer connections, never initiate them.
- Do not run other services on decoy interfaces; the installer offers to stop them.
- Use the lab bridge mode only for evaluation: there, decoys can reach the Docker host's bridge IP.
- Keep ReD-Pot updated (
git pull,sudo ./install.sh update) and watch the release notes. - Verify downloaded images with
gh attestation verifyif your policy requires provenance.
Reporting a vulnerability¶
See the Security policy.