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Release notes

The full changelog of every version, including older releases, is in CHANGELOG.md on GitHub. Releases and images: GitHub Releases · ghcr.io/redsidesecurity/red-pot:<version>.

1.0.1 - Community Edition - 2026-11-16

Bug-fix release. No configuration or database change.

Upgrading from 1.0.0: in place on the manager and on every remote sensor: git pull (or check out v1.0.1), then sudo ./install.sh update. Persona, baits, admin token, enrolled sensors and the database are kept. Versions before 1.0.0: uninstall, then install. See Update.

Added

  • sudo ./install.sh update: in-place update of a manager or remote sensor, with a backup first and an automatic rollback on any failure, including a dropped SSH session. An update cut off by a power loss is offered for rollback on the next run.
  • sudo ./install.sh set-access: change the web UI, sensor API and host SSH allow-lists without reinstalling, with the same exposure checks as the install and a gap-free firewall swap. It warns when the new sensor-API list leaves out an enrolled remote sensor.
  • add-decoy onto the management interface runs the same exposure checks.
  • The remote-sensor relay logs one line per minute instead of full tracebacks while the manager is unreachable.

Fixed

  • The network map and other console panels could fail with HTTP 500, and incoming event batches could be rejected, under concurrent load. Reads now use their own read-only database connections, and an event batch is stored completely or not at all.
  • The 24-hour network map could fail with "database or disk is full" on busy managers. SQLite temporary files now go to the data volume and the map query is bounded.
  • Live external activity on the attack map could miss L4 events during bursts of internal traffic. The newest L4+ events of the range now always stay in the feed.
  • IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:a.b.c.d) were treated as external and never matched the allow-lists. They are now handled as plain IPv4 everywhere.
  • The admin token was printed twice at the end of a manager install.
  • A remote sensor on DHCP could be locked out after an address change. The sensor installer now warns about DHCP leases, and set-access fixes the allow-list.
  • A forward jump of the manager's clock raised false "possible tampering" alerts. Decoy silence is now measured on the monotonic clock.

Security

  • The firewall apply could leave a short gap without rules, or fail open when interrupted. Rules are now swapped make-before-break, and a failed build keeps the previous rules.
  • Allow-list entries with host bits set (for example 1.2.3.4/0) were silently widened to a network. They are now refused.
  • The bait-document beacon trusted X-Forwarded-For from any client. It is now honoured only from configured console.trusted_proxies, and never matched against the allow-list.
  • Allow-lists and ports read back from the installer state are validated again; installer.json and INSTALL-INFO.txt are written atomically and never through a symlink.

Changed

  • The installer warns that bait documents only report from addresses in the web UI allow-list.

1.0.0 - Community Edition - 2026-11-13

First release of ReD-Pot Community Edition (MIT).

Upgrading: fresh installs only. Uninstall v0.3.x / v0.4.x, then install 1.0.0.

Added

  • Export of incidents and alert records for a date range, from the console (Incidents → Export JSON) and with sudo ./install.sh export.
  • Decoy limit of 3 (local decoys + remote sensors + pending joins), shown in the console; pending joins can be cancelled.
  • Edition label in the console header.
  • After an outage, a remote sensor reports how many events it could not deliver.
  • tests/lab_scenarios.sh builds a 3-decoy lab with simulated workstations.
  • Release pipeline: multi-architecture images on ghcr.io with provenance and SBOM.

Changed

  • One decoy per interface, on that interface's own IP; the address question is gone.
  • Persona: the installer asks only the domain and the industry; company name, NetBIOS name and mail domain are derived, users come from a larger built-in pool.
  • Fewer honeypot tells: realistic file dates and Word metadata, a full-size AD directory on the DC, no anonymous share listing, real MAC in NetBIOS replies, Windows-like DNS, RDP, LDAPS and HTTPS fingerprints, Apache-style web error pages.
  • Flood and DoS handling: one connection budget per decoy, bounded SMB named pipes and SSH channels, flood and resource-exhaustion events, a "possible DoS" incident when a decoy is saturated, and a 30-second service health check.
  • Port-scan detection also covers small decoys (every port of one decoy within 10 minutes).
  • Sensor timestamps older than 15 minutes or more than 5 minutes in the future are replaced by the manager's time.

Removed

  • Outbound alerting (Telegram and JSON webhook) and offline spool replay.
  • Decoys on extra addresses (macvlan, free IPs, VLAN placement, vendor MAC addresses).
  • Changing the persona after install.

Security

  • SMB IPC$ is pipe-only; admin shares are never mapped to a directory.
  • Decoy interfaces show only the decoy's ports; admin ports are accepted only on the management interface.
  • Allow-lists default to the admin's own address when a decoy shares the management interface.
  • The sensor join string is never put on a command line by the installer.
  • The server does not route for a decoy LAN; the firewall fails closed.
  • Decoy processes may only reply and report to the sensor API (egress guard).
  • Host-network decoys run with no-new-privileges and drop to an unprivileged user at start.