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Key features

Decoys

  • Five decoy roles, each a believable server with only that server's ports: Windows file server, Windows domain controller, Linux web hosting, FTP/backup server and Linux DNS server. See Decoy roles.
  • You choose the roles (up to 3 decoys in Community Edition), their host names and their network interfaces. Each decoy answers on its own interface's IP and MAC address, like a real server.
  • Your identity: the decoys carry your AD/DNS domain. The company name, NetBIOS name and mail domain are derived from it, and users are picked from a built-in name pool per installation.
  • Per-install randomness: passwords, keys, users, dates and file contents differ on every installation, so there is no shared fingerprint between ReD-Pot deployments.
  • Realistic protocol behaviour: SMB with NTLM logons, RDP with NLA, LDAP/LDAPS with NTLM binds, a Kerberos KDC that issues tickets for the bait accounts, Microsoft-style DNS, an Apache-like web server, vsftpd-like FTP, and an SSH server with a simulated shell. Nothing an attacker sends is executed. See Protocol behaviour.

Baits and honeytokens

  • Baits generated for your domain: passwords.txt, SSH deploy keys, .env files, database dumps, a Group Policy Preferences password, a Kerberoastable service account, and Word documents that report when they are opened.
  • The baits form a breadcrumb chain: credentials on one decoy unlock the next, so an intruder who takes the bait leaves a trail. See Breadcrumb chain.
  • Every bait is a honeytoken with a unique id. When it is used, ReD-Pot knows what was stolen, where from, who used it and where.

Detection and investigation

  • Severity ladder L1 touch to L5 honeytoken, with escalation for port scans, password spraying and path brute force.
  • Events from one source are grouped into one incident that only goes up the ladder.
  • Who did it: workstation name (from SMB, RDP and NTLM), the logged-on user, the user names tried, and the tools seen (user agents, SSH clients).
  • Internal network map with animated attack paths, and a world attack map for internet-facing decoys (offline GeoIP).
  • Tamper detection: a decoy that stops reporting opens an L4 "possible tampering" incident; a decoy whose services are flooded opens an L4 "possible DoS" incident.

Operations

  • One interactive installer with back, validation and a review screen, or fully unattended flags.
  • Remote sensors in other VLANs or offices over a certificate-pinned TLS link (about 0.6 kbit/s idle).
  • SIEM feed: alerts.json (JSON Lines, rotated and gzipped), optional events.json with every event.
  • Export of incidents and alert records for a date range, from the console or the command line.
  • Wall mode for SOC screens with a read-only kiosk link.
  • In-place update with backup and automatic rollback (sudo ./install.sh update).
  • Lightweight: Python and SQLite, no Elastic stack. About 140 MB RAM for the manager with two decoys.
  • Offline after installation: local GeoIP, no cloud services, no telemetry and no outbound alerts.

Hardened by default

Decoys run as an unprivileged user in read-only containers, with no capabilities except binding low ports, and with no-new-privileges. On a decoy's interface only the decoy's own ports answer; the admin ports answer only on the management interface, to allow-listed networks. See Security hardening.