Security policy¶
ReD-Pot is a security tool: it is meant to be attacked. The bugs that matter are the ones that let an attacker escape the decoy, reach the manager, tamper with alerts, or use ReD-Pot against your own network.
Reporting a vulnerability¶
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security problems. E-mail [email protected] with:
- what you found, and which version or commit,
- steps to reproduce (a proof of concept helps),
- the impact you believe it has.
We answer within 5 working days and credit researchers in the release notes, unless you prefer to stay anonymous.
In scope¶
- code execution inside or outside a decoy container,
- reaching the manager UI or sensor API from a decoy, or bypassing authentication,
- spoofing events for another sensor, forging or suppressing alerts,
- crashing a decoy or the manager with crafted traffic,
- leaking bait plaintext, keys or admin secrets from a sensor.
Out of scope¶
- "the decoy can be identified as a honeypot": please do tell us how, but as a normal issue,
- attacks that need root on the manager host,
- findings in the lab bridge mode that the documentation already lists as residual risk.
See also Security hardening.