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Decoy roles

Each role runs in its own container with only that role's ports. A decoy answers on the IP of its own network interface, with that interface's real MAC address, so a scan sees one server with exactly the ports of that role.

Windows file server

windows-file-server · looks like Windows Server 2019 Standard (build 17763) · default name FS01

Ports TCP 135, 139, 445, 3389
Services MSRPC, NetBIOS session, SMB (2.0.2 / 2.1), RDP with NLA
Shares Finance, HR, IT, Public
Baits IT\passwords.txt; IT\keys\*_deploy.key (SSH key); Salaries_2026.docx and Network_Overview.docx, which report when opened in Word

Windows domain controller

windows-domain-controller · Active Directory DC on Windows Server 2019 Standard · default name DC01

Ports TCP 53, 88, 135, 139, 389, 445, 464, 636, 3268, 3269, 3389; UDP 53, 88, 123, 137, 389
Services Microsoft-style DNS, Kerberos KDC, LDAP / LDAPS / Global Catalog, CLDAP, NetBIOS name service, NTP, SMB with SYSVOL and NETLOGON, RDP
Directory about 125 objects like a real Server 2019 domain: default containers, builtin and domain groups, default GPOs, a company OU tree with departments, one workstation per employee
Baits SYSVOL\...\Groups.xml with a GPP cpassword (decryptable with gpp-decrypt); NETLOGON\logon.bat with a service password, plus scripts with passwords for the backup, web and DNS decoys; LDAP honey users, including the Kerberoastable svc_sql (SPN, password in its description)

Linux web hosting

linux-web-hosting · Ubuntu 22.04 with Apache and PHP · default name WEB01

Ports TCP 22, 80, 443
Front page company webmail (default), IT service desk with knowledge base, or intranet, chosen at install (--web-theme)
Baits /.env with the portal admin seed password, a database password reused on the backup FTP and, with a DC, an LDAP bind account; robots.txt; /admin login; SSH with a simulated shell and believable home directories

A stolen bait password opens a believable inbox or ticket queue and raises an L5 alert.

FTP / backup server

ftp-backup-server · Debian 12 with vsftpd · default name BKP01

Ports TCP 21, 22
Baits /backups/<web>_portal_db_<YYYY-MM>.sql (admin MD5 hash and hint); a real <web>_portal_site_<YYYY-MM>.tar.gz; configs/backup_job.ps1 (domain service account); configs/*.sh and upload.netrc with passwords for the other decoys

The FTP root (/srv/ftp) is also visible over SSH, with the same files.

Linux DNS server

linux-dns-server · Ubuntu 22.04 with BIND 9 · default name DNS01

Ports TCP 22, 53; UDP 53
Zone authoritative zone that resolves the other decoys (dc01, files, intranet, backup ... and _ldap._tcp SRV records)
Baits the dnsadmin SSH password is planted on other decoys; ~dnsadmin holds notes with credentials for them

Choosing roles

  • With one decoy, a file server is the most common target of share enumeration and credential hunting.
  • A domain controller catches Active Directory recon: LDAP enumeration, Kerberoasting, GPP passwords, BloodHound-style collection.
  • A file server + web server + backup server set gives the longest breadcrumb chain for lateral movement.
  • A web decoy on a public address doubles as an internet-facing sensor for the world map.