Protocol behaviour¶
What an attacker sees on each protocol, and what ReD-Pot logs.
| Protocol | Behaviour | Logged as |
|---|---|---|
| SMB | SMB 2.0.2 / 2.1 only (SMB1 refused like a hardened Server 2019); persona OS version, names and a stable ServerGUID; a Windows-like share list (ADMIN$, C$, IPC$) for a logged-on bait user. A null session cannot list shares but can open the read-only bait shares by name. IPC$ is pipe-only, and ADMIN$ / C$ refuse access. A named logon succeeds only with a bait password valid on this decoy (NTLMv2/v1 verified); anything else gets STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE. Uploads to Public go to an inert upload store; other shares deny access |
user, domain, workstation name, shares, files read and written. Failed logons feed spraying detection; bait name with a wrong password = L4, correct bait password = L5; any use of IPC$, ADMIN$ or C$ as a disk = smb.admin_share (L3) |
| SSH | Ed25519 / ECDSA / RSA host keys, password and key authentication, a simulated bash with quoting, $VAR, ; && \|\|, pipes (grep, head, tail, wc, sort) and redirections. Nothing is executed |
every command; download URLs are recorded, never fetched |
| HTTP / HTTPS | webmail, helpdesk or intranet front page, /admin login, .env, Apache 2.4.52 (Ubuntu) error pages and header order, Apache's default SSL site on 443 |
path, user agent, scanner verdict; exploit payloads (Log4Shell, path traversal ...) and unusual methods raise http.scanner |
| FTP | vsftpd banner, listing and download (root /srv/ftp, also visible over SSH). Uploads are stored inert (mode 0400, named by SHA-256) within a per-sensor quota shared with SMB |
logins, files; uploads over the quota are logged with dropped |
| RDP | X.224 + TLS + CredSSP/NLA like Windows Server 2019 with NLA required; persona NTLM challenge (what rdp-ntlm-info shows). The NTLM AUTHENTICATE message gives user, domain and workstation; the logon never completes (correct bait password: "logon type not granted", else logon failure) |
rdp.auth (L3) with user, domain and workstation; L5 for a correct bait password, L4 for a bait name with a wrong one |
| LDAP / LDAPS / GC | real rootDSE with Windows BER encoding, AD-accurate errors, simple, Sicily NTLM and SASL GSS-SPNEGO NTLM binds verified against the bait accounts, real filter evaluation. LDAPS and GC-over-SSL present a certificate from a per-install fake enterprise CA following the "Domain Controller" template | binds (with workstation) and searches, for example servicePrincipalName=* |
| Kerberos | a real KDC for the bait accounts: the correct password gives a TGT; the TGS for a honey SPN is encrypted with that account's key, so the Kerberoast hash cracks to the bait password. Everyone else gets PREAUTH_REQUIRED, C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or PREAUTH_FAILED |
user enumeration, password guesses (auth.failed, feeds spraying), TGT issued, Kerberoasting |
| CLDAP / NetBIOS / NTP (DC, UDP) | netlogon "LDAP ping" answered from the persona; NetBIOS name and node status with the decoy NIC's real MAC; NTP server (stratum 3) | DC locator pings, nbtstat -A / nbtscan, time queries |
| DNS | authoritative for your zone only, never an open resolver. Out of zone: REFUSED (BIND on the DNS role) or SERVFAIL (Microsoft DNS on the DC). version.bind: BIND 9 on the DNS role, NOTIMP on the DC. UDP is rate-limited, replies are at most 4 times the request size. Zone transfers are refused |
lookups, zone-transfer (AXFR) attempts, version.bind fingerprinting |
Resource limits¶
| Limit | Value |
|---|---|
| Concurrent connections per decoy | 250 |
| Connections per source IP | 20 |
| Thread ceiling for new clients | 320 (container limit 384) |
| SMB session without named logon, idle | closed after 60 s |
| SMB named pipes | 8 per session, 16 per source IP, 128 per decoy |
| SSH channels per connection | 10 |
| Upload quota per sensor (SMB + FTP) | RPOT_UPLOAD_MAX_MB 200, RPOT_UPLOAD_MAX_FILES 500, RPOT_UPLOAD_MAX_FILE_MB 20 |
A source that hits a cap raises a level-3 conn.flood event (once a minute per source). Hitting its own pipe or channel
cap raises a level-4 event. When the decoy-wide cap refuses a client, the manager opens an L4 "Decoy NAME saturated -
possible DoS" incident naming the top source addresses.